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	 The	transitional	economies	of	India	and	China	were	excluded	from	previous	UNFCCC	mitigation	targets	because	of	their	classification	as	“developing”	states.	China	has	a	current	population	of	1.357	billion	people,	with	India	at	1.252	billion.405	With	a	collective	population	of	2.609	billion,	these	two	nations	contain	over	one-third	of	the	world’s	population,	and	thus	present	the	greatest	total	emissions,	as	well	as	the	greatest	emissions	potential.	As	such,	many	parties	believe	that	these	nations	should	bear	the	primary	responsibility	for	mitigation,	diminishing	any	special	obligation	held	by	the	United	States.		 Though	the	United	States	is	the	largest	historical	emitter,	today,	China	emits	the	greatest	total	of	greenhouse	gases,	at	approximately	10.5	gigatons	of	CO2	equivalent.406	This	represents	approximately	22	percent	of	world	emissions,	and	15	percent	of	cumulative	emissions	from	the	period	1990	to	2011.407	By	contrast,	India	emits	approximately	2.25	gigatons	of	CO2	equivalent,	5	percent	of	current	world	emissions,	and	only	4	percent	of	the	cumulative	emissions	released	from	1990	and	2011.408	These	rapidly	emerging	economies	are	developing	at	an	unprecedented	pace;	the	emissions	trajectory	of	that	development	on	so	large	a	scale	has	significant	potential	to	vastly	impact	world	emissions.		 Does	this	rapid	development	impose	additional	mitigation	duties	on	China	and	India	to	be	environmentally	conscious	as	they	develop?	Almost	certainly.	But	the	existence	of	a	growing	obligation	in	one	part	of	the	world	in	no	way	diminishes	existing	special	responsibilities	elsewhere.	For	the	sake	of	elucidation,	imagine	that	through	your	own	
																																																						405	"Population,	total,"	World	Bank,	Accessed	April	07,	2017.	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.	406	Ge,	Freidrich,	and	Damassa,	“6	Graphs.”	407	Ibid.	408	Ibid.	
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direct	action,	you	fell	a	tree	on	your	property	and	it	smashes	your	neighbor’s	fence.	On	the	other	side	of	the	property,	your	neighbor’s	other	neighbors	follow	suit,	and	topple	an	even	larger	tree	on	the	same	neighbor’s	opposite	fence.	Meanwhile,	the	neighborhood	children	have	been	known	to	throw	pebbles	at	the	fence,	causing	negligible	damage.	You	have	been	known	to	give	long	speeches	declaring	yourself	the	leader	of	the	neighborhood,	and	were	instrumental	in	creating	a	homeowner’s	association	policy	about	the	dangers	of	tree	toppling.	Who	ought	to	pay	for	fixing	the	fence?	Though	all	parties	in	the	neighborhood	are	responsible	in	varying	degrees,	it	seems	that	you	have	a	heightened	special	responsibility	to	pay	for	the	fence	repair	well	exceeding	that	of	the	pebble-throwers;	this	special	responsibility	is	by	no	means	removed	by	saying,	“But	look	at	your	other	neighbors!	They	damaged	that	fence	even	more!”	While	they,	too,	should	pay	for	the	fence	they	damaged,	and	learn	to	fell	trees	in	a	different	manner,	so	too	should	you	own	up	to	your	special	responsibility	to	mitigate	harm	to	your	neighbor.409		 Likewise,	the	United	States	has	a	heightened	obligation	to	right	the	harms	of	the	climate	change	it	has	caused	despite	the	fact	that	developing	nations	have	made	negligible	contributions	to	the	overarching	damages.	The	actions	of	China	and	India,	though	causing	similar	and	even	greater	damage	than	the	United	States	in	the	present	day,	cannot	possibly	eliminate	the	United	States’	special	obligations	to	compensate	for	its	own	damages	and	live	up	to	the	expectations	it	has	created	as	the	leader	of	the	neighborhood	and	a	prominent	creator	of	related	policy.			 There	is	a	separate	aspect	to	the	emissions	of	China	and	India	that	ought	to	be	addressed,	namely,	why	the	U.S.	ought	to	mitigate	while	these	developing	economies	
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continue	to	grow	with	high	emissions.	Essentially,	this	is	the	free-rider	problem	in	its	most	basic	form,	and	it	is	important	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	ethical	duties	and	obligations	hold	even	when	faced	with	perceived	defection	from	another	party.	The	duties	which	ground	the	argument	for	special	responsibilities	of	the	United	States	–	compensating	for	cumulative	harms	and	fulfilling	its	self-proclaimed	leadership	role	–	are	not	conditional	on	compliance	by	other	parties.	Though	China	is	now	the	world’s	largest	emitter,	it	does	not	follow	that	by	virtue	of	its	larger	contributions,	the	U.S.	is	somehow	off	the	hook	for	the	ramifications	of	its	own	actions,	even	if	China	were	making	zero	efforts	to	curb	emissions.	Consider	a	drowning	child	in	a	pool.	There	is	a	lifeguard	on	duty	–	the	best	swimmer	in	the	area	by	the	pool	–	but	said	lifeguard	has	fallen	asleep	on	the	job.	You	may	not	be	a	lifeguard,	but	you’re	the	second-best	swimmer	in	the	pool;	it	seems	that	the	lifeguard’s	inaction	would	not	excuse	inaction	on	your	part	and	you	should	take	steps	to	save	the	child	immediately.	Similarly,	even	if	China	had	made	it	explicitly	clear	that	it	had	no	intentions	to	curb	emissions,	the	U.S.	would	still	be	culpable	for	its	individual	duties,	regardless	of	defection	elsewhere.	Fortunately,	China	and	India	have	both	taken	steps	through	INDCs	and	bilateral	agreements	with	the	U.S.	to	reduce	emissions	and	mitigate	climate	change.	Though	their	populations	represent	vast	emissions	potential,	mitigation	on	the	part	of	the	U.S.	can	have	positive	results	regardless	through	marginal	good	created	by	marginal	reductions.	The	influence	of	U.S.	action,	as	seen	through	these	bilateral	agreements,	can	also	affect	actions	throughout	the	globe,	including	in	China	and	India.		 Furthermore,	it	is	likewise	important	to	note	that	while	the	development	of	China	and	India	is	certainly	causing	emissions,	the	rate	of	emissions	growth	has	significantly	slowed	in	recent	years	because	of	mitigation	on	their	parts.	China’s	CO2	emissions	
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decreased	by	0.7	percent	from	2014	to	2015,	primarily	attributable	to	a	1.5	percent	decline	in	coal	usage	and	an	increase	in	natural	gas	of	4.7	percent.410	While	in	previous	years,	China	had	increased	its	emissions	from	between	2.0	and	4.4	percent	on	pace	with	economic	growth,	2015	marked	the	first	year	of	greenhouse	gas	decrease	coupled	with	7	percent	economic	growth.411	For	the	tenth	consecutive	year,	China	also	added	more	new	hydropower	capacity	than	the	rest	of	the	world	combined,	increasing	its	capacity	by	5	percent	and	reaching	19.5	percent	of	domestic	electricity	generation	through	hydropower.412	Wind,	solar,	and	renewable	energies	increased	20	percent	in	2015,	reaching	a	total	of	5	percent	overall	electricity	generation.413		 India	continued	its	trend	of	increased	emissions,	at	a	rate	of	approximately	5.1	percent	from	2014	to	2015.	However,	this	growth	rate	is	below	the	average	2006-2015	period	rate	of	6.8	percent.414	Furthermore,	India’s	per	capita	emissions	of	just	1.9	tons	CO2e/person	is	three	times	lower	than	the	per	capita	emissions	of	the	EU	and	lower	than	average	per	capita	emissions	in	most	developing	countries.	It	emissions	increase	continues	to	be	coupled	with	its	economic	development	output.415	Total	electricity	output	is	primarily	responsible	for	the	increase,	but	India	expanded	its	renewable	energy	by	13.7	percent	in	2015,	and	nuclear	energy	by	9.6	percent.	It	aims	to	reach	40	percent	non-fossil	energy	sources	by	2030	in	its	INDC.416	
																																																						410	"Trends	in	Global	CO2	Emissions:	2016	Report,"	European	Commission	Joint	Research	Centre	and	PBL	Netherlands	Environmental	Assessment	Agency,	2017,	19.	411	Ibid,	21.	412	Ibid,	22.	413	Ibid.	414	Ibid,	30.	415	Ibid.	416	Ibid.,	31.	
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	 Though	India	and	China	certainly	share	mitigation	duties,	the	existence	of	these	duties	do	not	eliminate	the	need	for	U.S.	leadership,	nor	do	they	diminish	the	special	responsibilities	held	by	the	United	States.	The	world	is	right	to	recognize	that	the	development	of	these	countries	presents	significant	emissions	challenges,	but	those	who	think	that	the	U.S.	is	off	the	hook	because	China	now	emits	more	than	we	do	are	missing	the	nuances	of	the	issue.	Multiple	parties	can	share	in	responsibility;	the	U.S.	maintains	a	heightened	special	responsibility	to	mitigate	based	on	its	cumulative	harms	and	its	position	as	a	world	leader.	B.	Donald	Trump		 On	May	26,	2016,	a	few	months	ahead	of	his	election,	Donald	Trump	made	a	speech	specifically	relating	to	climate	change	and	the	Paris	Agreement.	In	this	speech,	Trump	referred	to	the	U.S.’s	domestic	policies	of	mitigation	as	the	“totalitarian	tactics”	of	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency,	promising	that	his	presidency	would	dismantle	the	agency	and	eliminate	the	“draconian	climate	rules”	which	were	costing	the	American	economy.417	He	then	directly	addressed	the	Paris	Agreement,	stating	that	he	would	“cancel”	it	by	withdrawing	funding	for	any	U.N.	programs	associated	with	global	warming	and	removing	domestic	policies	for	U.S.	emission	targets.418	He	identified	the	Paris	Agreement	as	being	“bad	for	U.S.	business,”	with	“foreign	bureaucrats	[controlling]	how	much	energy	we	use.”419		
																																																						417	Benjy	Sarlin,	"Donald	Trump	Pledges	to	Rip	Up	Paris	Climate	Agreement	in	Energy	Speech,"	NBCUniversal	News	Group,	May	26,	2016.	418	Ibid.	419	Matt	McGrath,	"Donald	Trump	would	'cancel'	Paris	climate	deal,"	BBC	News,	May	27,	2016.	
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	 Fast-forward	to	January	of	2017,	when	President	Trump	took	office.	Myron	Ebell,	the	head	of	Trump’s	EPA	transition	team,	verbalized	what	he	perceived	to	be	Trump’s	likely	course	of	action	in	the	coming	months	on	climate	change,	stating	that	Trump’s	presidency	would	reflect	a	shift	and	reversal	of	the	climate	change	policy	course	set	by	the	Obama	administration.420	Ebell	stated	that	Trump	had	made	it	clear	to	him	that	under	his	leadership,	the	United	States	would	withdraw	from	the	Paris	Agreement	entirely.421	Whether	or	not	this	statement	accurately	reflects	Trump’s	actions	–	what	he	says,	what	others	say	he	said,	and	what	he	actually	does	are	far	different	things	–	Ebell’s	and	Trump’s	statements	give	the	world	a	reason	to	fear	that	the	next	four	years	will	cripple	the	United	States’	ability	to	meet	its	own	emission	targets,	and	will	certainly	damper	its	ability	to	exert	global	influence.		 In	March	of	2017,	this	fear	became	more	solidified	as	Trump	released	his	proposed	budget.	President	Trump’s	blueprint	for	the	next	fiscal	year	cut	funding	for	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	by	a	gutting	31	percent.422	Though	this	was	by	no	means	the	only	cut	Trump	made,	the	EPA	was	arguably	the	hardest-hit	bureaucratic	federal	agency,	stripping	$2.6	billion	from	its	$8.2	billion	budget,	and	giving	the	agency	the	lowest	funding	it	has	received	in	40	years	when	adjusted	for	inflation.423	This	cut	was	radical	even	from	a	Republican	perspective;	in	the	previous	year,	the	House	Spending	subcommittee	suggested	a	cut	to	EPA	funding	in	the	amount	of	$291	million,	leaving	$8	billion	allocated	to	
																																																						420	Reuters,	"President	Trump	Prepares	to	Withdraw	from	Groundbreaking	Climate	Change	Agreement,	Transition	Official	Says,"	Fortune,	January	30,	2017.	421	Ibid.	422	Glenn	Thrush	and	Coral	Davenport,	"Donald	Trump	Budget	Slashes	Funds	for	E.P.A.	and	State	Department,"	The	New	York	Times,	March	15,	2017.	423	Ibid.	
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the	agency.424	The	detrimental	cut	signals	not	only	practical	limitations	in	U.S.	ability	to	implement	mitigation	policy,	but	also	signals	that	Trump	has	no	plans	to	make	environmental	activism	or	carbon	mitigation	a	priority	in	his	administration.	Rather	than	making	advancements,	his	administration	intends	to	in	fact	reverse	policies	already	in	place;	for	that	reason,	his	presidency	stands	as	the	largest	pragmatic	roadblock	to	the	U.S.	involvement	in	the	Paris	Agreement	and	in	global	environmental	leadership,	and	also	might	give	us	reason	to	question	placing	heightened	responsibility	onto	the	United	States	as	an	institution.		 However,	while	the	leadership	of	Donald	Trump	does	not	seem	to	bode	well	for	domestic	climate	change	policy,	the	existence	of	pragmatic	obstacles	to	reaching	domestic	obligations	does	not	mean	that	no	such	obligations	exist,	nor	lessen	their	veracity.	Obstacles	in	the	way	of	a	graduate	paying	off	student	loan	debt	do	not	clear	the	debt	nor	her	responsibility	to	pay.	Similarly,	the	difficulty	of	solving	a	math	problem	does	not	mean	that	no	solution	exists,	merely	that	it	is	yet	unsolved.	Donald	Trump’s	presidency	and	budget	cuts	to	the	EPA	give	us	reason	to	worry,	for	the	rest	of	the	world	to	voluntarily	increase	its	mitigation,	and	for	us	to	protest,	but	the	obstacle	alone	does	not	stand	as	an	objection	to	the	existence	of	a	responsibility.	Rather,	it	increases	the	imperative	for	innovative	solutions	to	domestically	combat	climate	change	and	meet	our	obligations	in	spite	of	contrary	public	policy.	VI.	Conclusion		 U.S.	climate	policy	has	had	a	profound	impact	upon	the	success	or	failure	of	international	environmental	law	agreements,	most	notably	in	its	role	in	the	Kyoto	and	
																																																						424	Ibid.	
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Montreal	Protocols.	Given	the	historical	emissions	of	the	United	States,	as	well	as	its	status	as	a	professed	leader	in	climate	change	policy,	the	U.S.	has	incurred	special	obligations	to	lead	both	domestic	and	international	mitigation	strategies	beyond	the	shared	responsibility	common	to	all	stakeholders.	These	special	obligations	can	be	met	through	meeting	its	Paris	commitments,	and	through	support	of	developing	nations	as	requested	by	their	INDCs	and	joint	position	statements.	Though	other	parties,	such	as	China	and	India,	must	also	play	a	significant	role	in	securing	meaningful	global	mitigation,	responsibilities	of	other	parties	to	not	pose	a	direct	objection	to	the	special	responsibilities	held	by	the	United	States.	Furthermore,	the	administration	of	a	leader	generally	opposed	to	climate	change	mitigation	policy	does	not	diminished	the	responsibility	of	the	United	States	in	that	dimension;	rather	it	imposes	a	pragmatic	obstacle	that	must	be	overcome	through	private	and	state-led	initiatives	that	the	administration	cannot	touch	rather	than	through	federal	policy.	As	such,	U.S.	leadership	plays	an	essential	role	in	climate	change	mitigation	on	the	international	level,	regardless	of	particular	domestic	laws	or	administrations,	and	the	world	has	a	right	to	hold	that	the	United	States	ethically	ought	to	deliver	on	the	promises	and	expectations	it	has	cultivated	in	international	contexts.		
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Overall	Conclusions	
	 The	purpose	of	this	paper	was	to	examine	the	connection	between	United	States	leadership	and	the	matrix	of	international	environmental	law,	and	to	further	assess	the	ethical	duties	of	the	United	States	in	light	of	its	role.	Beginning	with	a	harm-based	approach	to	mitigation	ethics,	I	rooted	my	thesis	on	the	moral	assertion	that	it	is	prima	facie	wrong	to	cause	harm	to	other	people,	and	explored	the	extent	to	which	climate	change	and	related	emissions	constitutes	a	global	harm.	By	concluding	that	climate	change	is	causing	real	harms	to	people	in	both	the	present	and	future,	and	that	emissions	were	disproportionately	allocated	amongst	developed	countries,	namely	the	United	States,	I	established	a	causal	link	between	U.S.	emissions	and	climate	change	harm.	I	concluded	this	section	by	establishing	an	ethical	duty	to	combat	climate	change	through	aggressive	mitigation	in	the	present.		 I	then	turned	my	attentions	to	international	institutions,	whose	record	in	establishing	and	coordinating	effective	environmental	law	treaties	has	been	mixed.	The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	and	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	are	the	most	relevant	institutions	best-suited	to	combatting	climate	change	in	international	contexts.	While	the	IPCC	has	consistently	met	its	intended	function	in	collecting	international	data	on	emissions,	assessing	present	harms,	and	measuring	the	likelihood	of	future	outcomes,	the	policy	results	of	the	UNFCCC	have	been	largely	ineffective.	By	introducing	both	the	Montreal	Protocol/Vienna	Convention	and	Kyoto	Protocol,	I	attempted	to	analyze	the	factors	which	led	to	the	relative	success	and	failure	of	each.	I	ultimately	concluded	that	the	UNFCCC,	by	virtue	of	its	high	membership	and	
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establish	structures,	was	in	a	good	position	to	create	effective	treaties	with	the	addition	of	more	flexible	methods	of	inclusion	in	meeting	its	intended	goals.		 I	then	turned	my	attentions	to	the	most	recent	UNFCCC	treaty:	the	landmark	Paris	Climate	Agreement	signed	in	2015.	This	agreement	was	revolutionary	for	the	UNFCCC	in	that	it	met	the	UNFCCC’s	commitment	to	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	through	new	manners.	The	UNFCCC	established	the	global	goal	of	limiting	warming	to	2	degrees	Celsius	by	the	year	2100;	with	that	mammoth	task	in	mind,	it	asked	all	countries	to	be	as	ambitious	as	possible	in	setting	their	targets.	The	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contributions	(INDCs)	thus	allowed	for	inclusion	of	developing	countries	previously	excluded	under	the	annex	system	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	while	understanding	that	developing	nations	were	less	able	to	combat	climate	change	then	developed	ones.	The	rapid	pace	with	which	the	Paris	Agreement	entered	into	force	–	within	a	year	of	initial	signing	–	displays	the	high	levels	of	willingness	within	the	global	community	to	make	individual	sacrifices	for	the	collective	good	of	climate	change	mitigation.	Though	the	Agreement	will	not	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	stated	warming	goals,	it	nevertheless	stands	as	a	testament	to	potential	of	the	international	community,	and	acts	as	a	starting	point	for	future	negotiations	in	the	post-2020	period.		 Chapter	4	analyzed	the	United	States	specifically,	and	established	a	case	for	special	responsibilities	on	behalf	of	that	particular	nation.	Though	the	impetus	to	stop	climate	change	is	a	global	problem,	and	all	countries	share	in	the	responsibility	to	care	for	the	planet,	the	burdens	of	mitigation	derive	from	duties	that	are	not	equally	dispersed	across	nations.	Following	a	harm-based	approach	established	in	Chapter	1,	this	chapter	aims	to	show	that	the	harms	caused	by	the	U.S.	give	us	reason	to	place	special	responsibilities	on	
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that	nation	to	mitigate	climate	change	aggressively,	above	and	beyond	those	responsibilities	shared	by	the	rest	of	the	world.	Furthermore,	additional	responsibilities	have	been	incurred	by	the	U.S.	through	their	voluntarily	incurred	role	as	a	leader	in	U.S.	climate	change.	By	shaping	these	institutions	and	declaring	themselves	a	world	leader,	the	United	States	has	established	a	long	history	of	global	expectations	that	it	has	consciously	cultivated	through	the	way	it	prefers	to	be	viewed.	In	taking	on	this	role,	the	United	States	has	incurred	further	responsibilities	to	meet	these	expectations.	Though	pragmatic	considerations,	such	as	rising	emissions	elsewhere	and	the	present	administration,	ought	to	be	considered	by	the	globe	in	approaching	the	next	four	years	of	climate	change	policy,	objections	on	pragmatic	grounds	do	not	negate	the	ethical	imperatives	established	in	this	chapter.		 Further	exploration	into	U.S.	leadership	and	international	environmental	law	should	likely	begin	in	the	technological	sector.	Mission	Innovation,	funded	by	Bill	Gates,	might	very	well	be	the	only	Paris	commitment	that	the	U.S.	is	able	to	fulfill	because	it	depends	on	the	private	rather	than	public	sector.	Furthermore,	the	strength	of	U.S.	leadership	demonstrated	during	the	Montreal	Protocol,	as	well	as	the	heightened	quality	of	ambitions	articulated	by	that	country	during	those	negotiations,	might	give	us	reason	to	believe	that	potential	for	U.S.	profit	largely	drives	U.S.	enthusiasm	in	international	environmental	law.	For	that	reason,	potential	for	technology	profit	in	developing	countries	might	incentivize	the	U.S.	to	drive	ambitious	bargains	and	protocols	in	the	future	once	sufficient	research	and	development	is	launched	through	private	investors.		 In	regards	to	the	leadership	of	the	present	Trump	administration,	policy	research	should	greatly	explore	the	extent	to	which	Paris	Agreement	commitments	could	be	fully	
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realized	without	the	help	of	any	federal	policy.	State-wide	initiatives	in	implementing	regulations	under	the	Clean	Power	Plan	on	a	voluntary,	non-federally	mandated	basis	could	allow	us	to	meet	our	international	obligations	without	compliance	from	coal	states	or	the	administration.	Coordination	on	the	state	level,	separate	from	the	institution	of	the	federal	government,	might	play	a	similar	role	to	the	UNFCCC	within	the	domestic	sphere,	though	the	extent	to	which	states	could	organize	bilateral	and	multilateral	agreements	amongst	themselves	is	highly	limited.	However,	just	as	the	U.S.	has	incurred	special	responsibilities	through	its	leadership	role	in	global	environmental	politics,	so	might	certain	states	have	special	responsibilities	to	lead	domestic	mitigation	and	encourage	other	states	to	do	likewise.	California	might	be	a	candidate	for	a	domestic	state-wide	leader	on	this	charge,	as	might	the	other	deep-blue	West-Coast	states	of	Oregon	and	Washington.	Further	investigation	as	to	the	ethical	nature	and	potential	of	special	responsibilities	on	the	state	level	would	be	required,	though	it	seems	intuitive	that	the	allocation	of	these	special	responsibilities	to	mitigate	and	coordinate	might	similarly	derive	from	considerations	of	harm,	capacity,	and	declared	roles,	much	as	it	does	on	the	international	level.		 												
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